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Article Overview 1 
Overweight and obesity is a global epidemic, contributing to 2.8 million deaths per 2 
year.1 Described by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as one of the most “visible - yet 3 
neglected - public health problems”,2 preventing and reducing obesity has been the focus of 4 
considerable trans-national and national intervention. In 2018, WHO’s Time to Deliver Report3 5 
was critical of progress made against a range of non-communicable diseases, including obesity, 6 
and recommended governments ‘engage constructively with the private sector’ to strengthen 7 
contributions to achieving public health goals. Building on existing in-depth analyses of 8 
systems for and approaches to obesity-related policy implementation,4 this commentary 9 
focuses on learning from the implementation of a specific national policy, Healthy Lives 10 
Healthy People: A call to action on obesity in England.5 A notable approach to this policy has 11 
been the UK Government’s engagement with food and drink-related industries throughout. 12 
Seven years into this ten-year strategy, we highlight the key challenges industry engagement 13 
has presented, and raise questions and recommendations for policy makers, public health 14 
organisations, and industry itself. 15 
   16 
Healthy Lives Healthy People: A call to action on obesity in England.  17 
Healthy Lives Healthy People: A call to action on obesity in England5 (hereafter 18 
referred to as ‘the call to action’) is of particular interest to policy makers and public health 19 
specialists given its bold and explicit aspirations to achieve both a sustained downward trend 20 
in the level of “excess weight” (wording used in ‘the call to action’) in children by 2020, and 21 
a downward trend in the level of “excess weight” averaged across all adults by 2020. This 22 
ambition was aligned with a strategy of collective engagement and shared responsibility; the 23 
policy emphasised roles for a wide range of stakeholders and delivery partners transcending 24 
health, social care, local authorities, and businesses. Explicitly, ‘the call to action’ aimed to 25 
‘harness the contribution of national partners – including businesses, with creation of 26 
responsibility deals, and brokering partnerships with business, civil society and the voluntary 27 
sector’.5  28 
The UK Government has faced several challenges in delivering on its strategy for 29 
business to take a “leading” or “greater” 5 role in obesity prevention and treatment. Here we 30 
focus on three interrelated challenges: (i) balancing collaboration whilst maintaining 31 
appropriate distance from industry stakeholders; (ii) resultant production of ‘watertight’ and 32 
effective legislation or intervention; and (iii) Government’s actual or perceived limited 33 
sanctioning or bargaining power. For each of these challenges, we present and critique a 34 
 3 
specific policy example. 1 
 2 
Challenge 1: Collaboration without conflict of interest.  3 
Concerns about the difficulties of managing business-related conflict-of-interest in 4 
public health policy making are widespread enough for the WHO to require those signed up to 5 
its Framework Convention on Tobacco to protect health policies from commercial and other 6 
vested interests of the tobacco industry.6 In the UK, the exclusion of the tobacco industry from 7 
policy environments whilst simultaneously entering into partnerships with food and alcohol 8 
industries has been criticized.7 Public-private partnerships are unlikely to be sustained if 9 
interests of Government (public health) and industry (stakeholder profit) are not equally 10 
served,8-9 which raises issues when these goals are misaligned or directly conflicting.  11 
To elaborate with one specific example, the UK Government’s 2010 Responsibility 12 
Deal10 has been criticised heavily for allowing food and drink brands to have input during its 13 
development. Profit motives are explicitly recognised - ‘a sound business case’ to ensure 14 
partner commitment is embedded in the logic model of the policy. However, businesses 15 
participating have reported doing so not only to meet corporate social responsibility 16 
commitments and enhance reputations, but also to reduce possibility of regulations.4 While the 17 
former appears worthwhile, such motives are often transient and a reliance on self-regulation 18 
has been criticised as ineffective across a range of sectors (e.g. chemical safety,11; tobacco and 19 
alcohol.12  Where this has been effective (e.g. environmental policy), it has been argued that 20 
this is only due to the maintenance of genuine legislative threat, external monitoring, and 21 
sanctions.13. This is not the case with the Responsibility Deal. Here, arguments that despite 22 
their differing motives, government-food industry partnerships would result in an enhanced 23 
response (e.g., through better collaboration) are undermined by criticism that eventual 24 
outcomes were weak or inappropriate. For instance, Knai and Colleagues14 analysed the 25 
effectiveness of the Responsibility Deal food pledges - out-of-home calorie labelling, salt 26 
reduction, calorie reduction, front-of-pack nutrition labelling, fruit and vegetable consumption, 27 
and saturated fats - reporting that in most cases pledges were already underway, with more 28 
structural approaches to improving diet (e.g. food pricing strategies, marketing restrictions) not 29 
represented. This is at odds with arguments that wider system change, as opposed to 30 
informational interventions targeting individuals, is necessary for public health improvement.15 31 
Thus, although the Responsibility Deal pledges were lauded as representing a genuine 32 
commitment from industry partners to improving public health,4 in reality, organisations 33 
continued with business as usual.  34 
 4 
A related challenge is that the visible involvement of industry with policy can lead to 1 
perceived contradictory messaging and resultant public confusion. For instance, where policy 2 
informs that high sugar products are detrimental to health (e.g. causing diabetes, tooth decay, 3 
obesity), brands involved in policy development simultaneously inform the population that 4 
their products can be healthy or consumed as part of a healthy lifestyle (e.g. Coca Cola Co.). 5 
The extensive marketing of this message has been criticised as normalising energy dense 6 
nutrient poor food consumption patterns at societal level.16 Ultimately, critics14 argue that the 7 
Responsibility Deal was fundamentally flawed in expecting industry to voluntarily act to 8 
improve public health whilst potentially threatening existing business models. In response to 9 
some of this criticism, more recent policy (e.g., ‘Child Obesity: A plan of action’) adopts a 10 
more robust approach by, for example, including taxation penalties for high sugar products. 11 
Appropriately developing and enforcing such legislation, however, has been another key 12 
challenge for Government.  13 
 14 
Challenge 2: Developing robust legislation and regulation. 15 
 Private partners involved in UK obesity-related policy openly declared their hopes to 16 
reduce the possibility of regulation,4 and where this was not possible, it was perhaps inevitable 17 
that companies lobbied for strategies to ‘soften’ regulation (e.g. reducing targets or penalties 18 
for non-compliance). This issue can be demonstrated by viewing the recent UK Government’s 19 
Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL),17 more commonly known as a ‘sugar tax’. The SDIL is a 20 
policy that “will help to reduce sugar in soft drinks and tackle childhood oebsity”.17 Intended 21 
to reduce the sugar content of products as well as reduce portion sizes, in many instances, 22 
industry response has focused on the latter mechanism as opposed to product reformulation. 23 
This might risk greater product consumption through lower satiety and therefore, no change in 24 
the ultimate volume of sugar consumed.  25 
It is unlikely that the Government would not have considered that industry might not 26 
reformulate and thus reduce the sugar content within products. It is also unlikely that they 27 
would not have considered that companies could and would opt to merely absorb the tax 28 
themselves or increase the price of their product to cover this loss. Adopting softer approaches 29 
(e.g. a tax as opposed to regulating a maximum level) enabled the UK Government to maintain 30 
positive relationships with industry, but undermined policy aims. Even strong legislation or 31 
regulatory standards are not enough; we must also have a Government willing and able to 32 
follow through with appropriate sanctions to drive compliance.14 This highlights a final 33 
underlying challenge for Government – how far it is willing to push industry? 34 
 5 
 1 
Challenge 3: A perception of limited sanctioning and bargaining power.  2 
Government appears in a difficult negotiating position when trying to encourage or 3 
enforce obesity—related action. Food and drink industry brands bring many benefits to the UK 4 
including contributions to GDP, employment, and wider investment and sponsorship (e.g. of 5 
major events). Collaborative working and genuine ‘buy-in’ from industry could accelerate the 6 
pace of public health improvement, however, history informs that in relation to public health 7 
intervention, pursuing partnerships rather than adopting a stronger governance approach 8 
reduces effectiveness of policy strategies (e.g. see effects of cutting ties with tobacco industry). 9 
We argue that currently Government is failing in its responsibility to the public by prioritising 10 
protection against potential loss of economic or employment-related benefits from industry 11 
over actual and current damage that existing practice has on public health.  12 
One area where some progress is being made is regarding marketing of unhealthy food 13 
and drink. For instance, the WHO Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity18 and 14 
Recommendations for Food Marketing and Non-Alcoholic Beverages19 both advocate 15 
minimising children’s exposure to the marketing of "foods that are high in saturated fats, trans-16 
fatty acids, free sugars, or salt” (p. 8).19 In the UK, policy relating to the marketing of unhealthy 17 
food and drink focuses on media placement restrictions and high fat, salt or sugar (HFSS) 18 
advertisements. Whilst commendable for attempting to limit the presence and influence of 19 
industry messaging, policy could again have been strengthened. For example, Government has 20 
yet to adopt the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Obesity’s recommendations that 21 
government “implement a 9pm watershed on advertisement of food and drink high in fat, sugar 22 
and salt”,20 and enforcement opportunities actioned elsewhere have not been implemented.21   23 
 24 
Where next?  25 
Relatively little progress in reducing ‘excess weight’ has been made during the seven years 26 
since 'the call to action' on obesity in England was released. We argue that this is at least 27 
partially attributed to industry involvement in policy, resulting in weak action. We recommend: 28 
(i) increased use of legislative powers; (ii) limiting industry influence in Government; and (iii) 29 
recognising and appropriately rewarding industry behaviour that benefits public health.  30 
i. History tells us that self-regulation amongst the food and drink industry does not meet 31 
public health objectives22 and Government involvement counts for little in the absence 32 
of sanctions to drive compliance.14 There is a need therefore to move beyond 33 
expectations and requests for industry to voluntarily self-regulate, and instead mandate 34 
 6 
changes that reduce the abundance of unhealthy food and drink products in society. 1 
Legislation should be used more widely and effectively across a range of areas 2 
including food content, labelling, and advertising. Methods available include imposing 3 
enforceable duties on bodies in a position to improve public health, and creating or 4 
expanding licensing, taxation, and inspection powers to create leverage.23 5 
ii. Industry influence in policy making must be limited. Consider what we can learn from 6 
the reduction of industry involvement in other public health topics. There was once a 7 
time when tobacco companies would have a seat at the top table to contribute to 8 
smoking cessation efforts – this did not work, and it was only once industry 9 
involvement decreased that smoking cessation strategies became more 10 
effective. Genuine partnerships or incentives for business can be maintained where the 11 
public health objective is prioritised foremost (e.g., Diet and Health Research Industry 12 
Club – Government and industry research for new or reformulated foods).24 It is also 13 
suggested that public health objectives are set prior to any potential partnership7 and 14 
that partnerships do not provide opportunities for re-negotiation of objectives, as 15 
observed in the Responsibility Deal.25 16 
iii. Finally, bold action that celebrates and supports the promotion of public health should 17 
be observed. There is a focus on identifying and criticising unhealthy food and drink 18 
companies – and rightly so – but we rarely see celebration of companies that develop, 19 
provide and support healthy behaviours. Government should provide financial and 20 
trading incentives for industries promoting population health, and in doing so, provide 21 
profit-based incentives for other industry to follow suit. 22 
 23 
Conclusion 24 
Intervention to reduce the consumption of unhealthy food and drink, and ultimately 25 
“excess weight” in the population, remains warranted. While policy such as the WHO’s Time 26 
to Deliver report continues to call for governments to ‘work with food and non-alcoholic 27 
beverage companies’, including regulation as an area for cooperative working is unhelpful. 28 
Industry has a vital role to play in enacting policy, but not in the generation of policy or policy 29 
objectives. To be explicit, industry has no competence in public health and therefore no role in 30 
making public health policy.1 To enable meaningful change, Government should strengthen its 31 
approach, and prioritise the known impact on population health of unhealthy food and drink 32 
                                                          
1 Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this turn of phrase.  
 7 
over the hypothetical economic impacts of losing industry favour. The responsibility is the 1 
Government’s, and industry must be made to deal with the consequences.   2 
 8 
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